




















This  chapter  describes  the  evolution  and  structure  of  the  international 
trading system, focusing on the tension between the fundamental GATT/WTO 
principle of most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment and the proliferation of 
discriminatory trading arrangements, including regional agreements as well 
as new versions of special and differential treatment of low-income countries. 
It also discusses the increasing pressure to use the enforcement power of the 
GATT/WTO system to achieve member compliance with social norms in the 
areas of labor and environment. The chapter concludes by considering some 
significant challenges that currently face the international trading system and 
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I.  Introduction 
 
The international trading “system” comprises many thousands of unilateral, 
bilateral, regional, and multilateral rules and agreements among more than two hundred 
independent nations.  Atop this complex and rapidly evolving mass of political and 
economic arrangements is the World Trade Organization (WTO), with 153 members that 
together account for nearly all of world trade.
1  Created in the Uruguay Round of 
multilateral negotiations as a successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), the WTO provides a legal and institutional framework for national policies that 
directly or indirectly affect international trade among its members.  Like the GATT, the 
primary goal of the WTO is to promote freer and more predictable conditions of trade.  
However, practice has gradually moved away from the principles that shaped the original 
GATT.  In the WTO, nondiscrimination among trading partners remains a fundamental 
principle, as laid out in the original GATT (now known as GATT 1947) and also in the 
updated GATT 1994 produced in the Uruguay Round.  Yet GATT rules also allow for 
preferential (i.e., discriminatory) policies, and these have become an increasingly 
important feature of the international trading system.  Likewise, although reciprocity has 
always played a key role in GATT/WTO procedures for multilateral trade negotiations 
and dispute settlement, the scope of non-reciprocal arrangements intended to benefit 
poorer countries has steadily expanded. 
  The WTO is the latest embodiment of multilateral efforts to promote cooperation 
among trading nations that began even before the end of World War II.  At the 1944 
                                                 
1 An overwhelming majority of the 153 members are developing countries, with 32 of the poorest classified 
as least developed countries (LDCs); 29 additional “observer” nations are working toward WTO 
membership.  http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm (accessed 3/8/2010).  
Significant nonmembers include the Russian Federation and several other major oil exporters.   2 
Bretton Woods Conference, which created the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), participating 
nations also recognized the need for a third institution, to be called the International 
Trade Organization (ITO).  The ITO was designed to prevent a resurgence of the 
protectionism of the pre-war period and continue the efforts toward reciprocal trade 
liberalization that were already in progress before the onset of the war.  In addition to 
trade policies, the new organization‟s authority was to include national policies toward 
foreign investment and business practices.  However, plans for the ITO were derailed 
when the U.S. Congress failed to ratify its ambitious draft charter. In its place, the more 
limited 1947 GATT treaty emerged as a “temporary” solution, one for which U.S. 
participation did not require Congressional approval.
2   
Despite its limited scope and resources, the GATT endured for nearly 50 years, its 
membership (formally, contracting parties or signatories) growing from an initial 23 to 
128 by 1994.
3  Prior to the Uruguay Round, which began in 1986, the GATT had already 
sponsored seven rounds of multilateral trade negotiations.  These had achieved a 
significant cumulative reduction in tariff rates.  By 1986, the trade-weighted average of 
tariffs on manufactured goods had been reduced to about 6.4 per cent, from about 35 per 
cent in 1947.
4  The GATT has thus been credited with a key role in facilitating the 
massive growth in the volume of world trade during the post-war era (Irwin 2002, 165-
170).   
                                                 
2  The GATT was an agreement rather than a full-fledged international organization and had “contracting 
parties” rather than members.  It came into effect during the ITO negotiations, with the goal of achieving 
immediate tariff reductions among the 23 participating countries (Hudec 1998).   
  
3 http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/gattmem_e.htm (accessed 3/8/2010). 
 
4 Crowley (2003) quoting Hoekman and Kostecki (1995).     3 
  Yet the GATT left some critical issues unresolved (Crowley 2003).  Although 
average tariff rates had been reduced substantially, stubborn peaks for individual products 
remained.  Some major industries, notably agriculture and textiles and apparel, had been 
excluded from normal GATT guidelines.  Even in covered sectors, importing nations 
were making extensive use of “administered” protection—such as antidumping actions, 
countervailing measures, and voluntary export restraints—to limit competition from 
abroad.  Moreover, GATT rules pertained mainly to trade in tangible goods, a significant 
limitation with international trade in services growing at a rapid rate.  Other issues 
closely linked to trade but not covered by GATT rules included national policies toward 
foreign direct investment and intellectual property.  And perhaps most central, the GATT 
provided no effective way to resolve disputes among the contracting parties.  
Concerns about these shortcomings of the GATT provided much of the agenda for 
the ambitious Uruguay Round (1986-1994), which culminated in establishment of the 
WTO.  Yet despite the fanfare surrounding the WTO‟s birth in 1995, doubts regarding 
the new organization soon began to materialize.  These doubts were heightened by lack 
of progress in the Doha Round begun in 2001, the first round of multilateral negotiations 
sponsored by the WTO.  Some critics have called for a new Bretton Woods conference to 
reconfigure the three major international economic organizations and reallocate 
responsibilities among them.   The goal would be to increase their overall effectiveness in 
addressing problems in global governance not anticipated in the 1940s, including huge 
bilateral trade imbalances and national efforts to limit climate change. 
Section 2 of this chapter describes the evolution and structure of the GATT/WTO 
system.  Section 3 deals with the tension between the fundamental GATT/WTO principle   4 
of most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment, i.e., nondiscrimination among trading partners, 
and the trend toward discriminatory trading arrangements, including the proliferation of 
regional agreements as well as new versions of special and differential treatment of low-
income countries.  Section 4 focuses on participation of developing countries in the 
system and the effort to use special treatment to promote development objectives.  
Section 5 discusses the pressure to use the enforcement power of the GATT/WTO system 
to achieve member compliance with social norms in the areas of environment and labor.  
Section 6 assesses some significant challenges that currently face the international trading 
system.  Section 7 concludes by considering possible directions of the system‟s evolution 
in response to these challenges. 
 
2.  The World Trade Organization 
Notwithstanding repeated threats of its imminent collapse over nearly eight years 
of negotiations, the Uruguay Round made remarkable headway in addressing some of the 
most important shortcomings that had plagued the GATT 1947.  While negotiators 
continued the traditional GATT-era work of reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers to 
manufactured goods trade (average tariff rates were reduced by 40 per cent), they also 
broke new ground with agreements to bring trade in services, textiles and apparel, and 
agricultural products into greater conformity with GATT norms.  The Round‟s significant 
achievements included negotiation of commitments to reduce agricultural subsidies, to 
phase out the Multifibre Arrangement (over a ten year period) and thus apply the same 
rules to trade in textiles and apparel as to trade in other manufactured goods, and to 
strengthen protection of intellectual property rights (with phase-in periods based on   5 
members‟ level of economic development).  Other agreements improved rules and 
procedures dealing with a variety of non-tariff measures, including subsidies, technical 
barriers to trade, and sanitary and phytosanitary measures.  The goal of these agreements 
was to balance member governments‟ acknowledged need to address domestic concerns 
against the potential for abuse of such policies as a disguised form of import protection or 
discrimination among trading partners.   
The Uruguay Round also departed from precedent in a fundamental respect.  With 
minor exceptions, all WTO members agreed to comply with the obligations spelled out in 
all the agreements, which were included in the “Single Undertaking.”  This need for 
consensus among all participants was in contrast to the approach used in the Tokyo 
Round, in which various “codes” governing use of non-tariff barriers were endorsed by 
only some members, primarily the most advanced countries. Rules in the Tokyo Round 
codes then applied only to trade among signatories.   However, there has recently been 
discussion of reverting to a system that does not require all members to move toward 
WTO goals at the same rate.
5 
  The most significant departure from the system created by GATT 1947 was a 
revamping of procedures for settling disputes among trading nations.  The WTO Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (DSU) introduced a systematic rules-based approach to 
resolving disputes concerning members‟ alleged failure to meet their WTO obligations.   
This system is usually described as self-enforcing, in that the WTO itself has no power to 
police national trade policies.  Rather, an affected member must initiate each dispute.    
                                                 
5 Hoekman and Kostecki (2009, 529-530).  An approach in which common policies are implemented at 
different rates is often called “variable geometry,” a phrase due to Jacques Delors.  However, because it 
refers to differences in speed of convergence to common policies, it leaves aside the more difficult 
situations in which there is no agreement on what the common policy should be.     6 
Under the current system, any dispute that cannot be resolved through direct negotiation 
among affected countries is referred to a panel of three experts, almost always specialists 
in international commercial relations, e.g., diplomats and trade lawyers.  The panel report 
is intended to provide a neutral judgment as to whether the member has violated 
GATT/WTO rules.
6  If the panel affirms that the contested policy is inconsistent with the 
member‟s WTO obligations, the member can appeal the decision, amend its policies, or 
face authorized retaliation from trading partners that have lost market access as a result of 
the violation.  Authorized retaliation (and often merely the threat of retaliatory action)—
in the form of partners‟ increased barriers designed to reduce the member‟s market access 
by an amount commensurate with the effect of the contested policy—provides the 
enforcement mechanism that maintains adherence to WTO rules and thus protects 
members‟ export market access.  The DSU is an important improvement over the GATT 
system, in which any country could in effect veto a panel decision that was contrary to its 
political or economic interests.   
   Similar to the role played by the GATT until the end of the Uruguay Round, the 
WTO serves as a forum for multilateral trade liberalization negotiations among its 
members.  The current Doha Round, initiated in 2001, is the first round of multilateral 
negotiations to be held under WTO sponsorship and is thus seen as a test of the new 
organization‟s ability to maintain forward momentum in trade liberalization.  The stalled 
round therefore brings the WTO framework into question.  But the WTO has important 
functions separate from its role as the facilitator of multilateral trade negotiations.  Most 
                                                 
6 More precisely, the panel report indicates whether the challenged policy is WTO-inconsistent.  This 
broader category also includes “non-violation complaints.”  In contrast to the more common disputes 
involving an allegation that a member has violated a WTO rule, these refer to situations in which the 
complainant has not received the anticipated benefit even though no rule has been violated.  Such 
complaints aim at preserving the balance of benefits intrinsic to reciprocal bargaining.       7 
important is its role discussed above as neutral arbitrator of trade disputes, i.e., in helping 
to assure that members actually receive the anticipated trade benefits of reciprocal 
liberalization.  The WTO also serves a monitoring and information-dissemination 
function, again building on its GATT roots.  The WTO collects and publishes data on 
trade flows as well as changes in trade policy undertaken by members between 
negotiating rounds (members are required to notify the WTO of certain policy changes, 
such as antidumping actions).  Under the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM), the 
WTO carries out periodic reviews of each member‟s trade policy regime; scheduled 
frequency of review is highest for the largest trading economies.
7   The results of the 
reviews, including the responses of member country officials, are made available on the 
WTO website.  Finally, as discussed in section 4 below, the WTO has also continued to 
expand the role gradually taken on by the GATT in promoting the trade interests of 
developing countries.
8   
 
3.  GATT/WTO principles and discriminatory trading 
At the start, the primary goal of the GATT was to promote nondiscriminatory 
trade liberalization.  The fundamental guidelines were nondiscrimination (most-favored-
nation treatment among signatories), reciprocity, and transparency.  MFN treatment was 
deemed important enough to be the subject of Article I of the GATT 1947, while the 
                                                 
7  This timing scheme is the opposite of what might be recommended, given that it dedicates most resources 
to the major countries, for which other agencies and organizations already provide ample and often more 
timely information.   Moreover, the review process is influenced by political as well as economic 
considerations.  To avoid controversy, reviewers may fail to emphasize the kinds of information that would 
be most helpful in ensuring members‟ adherence to their WTO commitments (Bown 2009, 219-220).   
 
8  In the early decades, poor countries were termed “less-developed” countries (LDCs).  Since adoption of 
the more optimistic but often inaccurate current terminology, LDC has become the acronym used to 
designate the least developed countries, i.e., the poorest of the poor. 
   8 
agreement‟s preamble called for members to enter into “reciprocal and mutually 
advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other 
barriers to trade” and Article XXVIII required “compensatory adjustment” when 
previously agreed concessions were modified.  The need for increased transparency was 
expressed in several GATT articles, especially Article X, requiring prompt publication by 
signatories of new laws and regulations affecting trade, and Article XI, calling for general 
elimination of quantitative restrictions on trade.  The underlying goal was to ensure that 
foreign suppliers would face known and constant barriers, ones that could be overcome 
by sufficiently competitive producers.  The strong preference specifically for the use of 
tariffs over quantitative restrictions or other types of trade policies also stemmed from the 
view that reliance on tariffs would simplify the future process of reciprocal liberalization.   
The early GATT priorities reflected the negotiating nations‟ desire to undo the 
harm to the international trading system that had occurred during the 1930s.  The Smoot-
Hawley tariffs enacted by the U.S. Congress in 1930 had soon been followed by similar 
“beggar-thy-neighbor” actions by other countries, as well as discriminatory arrangements 
such as the United Kingdom‟s imperial preferences, which entailed lower tariffs on 
imports from its colonies and dominions.  With the United States and England taking the 
leading roles, negotiators resumed efforts begun before World War II to lower barriers to 
trade through reciprocal reductions in bound tariff rates (reciprocity),
9 to replace 
                                                 
9 In the United States, the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act authorized the President to conduct 
bilateral negotiations with major trading partners to reverse the protectionist Smoot-Hawley tariffs on a 
reciprocal basis.  U.S. tariff cuts achieved through these negotiations were then extended to other trading 
partners through most-favored-nation treatment.  Negotiated reductions required no enabling legislation by 
Congress.   
   9 
quantitative restrictions and other nontariff barriers by tariff protection (transparency), 
and to eliminate discriminatory arrangements (most-favored-nation treatment).   
The initial success of the GATT in achieving these goals reflected mutual gains to 
the participating nations, but, given the overwhelming dominance of the United States in 
the world economy, the key factor was U.S. willingness to abide by GATT principles.  
Cuts in the first GATT round (1947) reduced U.S. average bound tariff rates by 26 
percent (Martin and Messerlin 2007).  However, changing conditions gradually diluted 
U.S. commitment, pushing the contracting parties toward a multi-tier system of 
responsibilities.  The first change was the surge in exports of manufactured goods from 
Japan and then from four even newer suppliers (Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and 
South Korea) collectively termed the Newly Industrializing Economies (NIEs) or Four 
Tigers.  To manage the increase in competing imports, the United States and the 
European Union used discriminatory policies involving extra-GATT bilateral agreements 
with individual exporters rather than the GATT‟s own safeguard procedures (Article 
XIX), which are meant to be applied on an MFN basis. The result was the spread of 
negotiated quantitative restrictions, first from Japan
10 to the NIEs, and then, especially for 
textiles and apparel, to many additional exporters.  By 1974, worldwide trade in textiles 
and apparel was controlled by the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA), a system of bilateral 
quotas limiting trade between most of the world‟s rich importers and most of the world‟s 
poor exporters of these products. 
At the same time, the list of contracting parties gradually expanded to include 
more of the world‟s poor countries.  The new signatories were often former colonies of 
                                                 
10  The United States had already negotiated bilateral trade restraints with Japan for textiles prior to World 
War II. 
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the original participants.  Perhaps inevitably in an organization operating on the basis of 
unanimity, provision for “special and differential treatment” of nations at an earlier stage 
of economic development expanded far beyond the initial vague commitment in GATT 
Part IV, which had been added in 1964.  Attention to the trade concerns of less-developed 
nations increased further during the “New International Economic Order” crusade of the 
1970s.  The issues raised by the increasing majority of poor countries among participants 
in the GATT/WTO system are discussed below in section 4. 
A final important change in the GATT/WTO system has been the surge in 
negotiation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs
11) among subsets of participating 
nations.  From the start, the GATT made provision for PTAs in Article XXIV, even 
though such arrangements represented an explicit departure from the GATT/WTO 
guiding principle of nondiscriminatory trade among signatories, i.e., most-favored-nation 
treatment.  In the WTO, Article XXIV of the GATT 1994, together with the Uruguay 
Round “Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade,” set rules governing PTAs for goods; Article V of the GATS 
contains corresponding rules for services.   
The GATT/WTO position on PTAs recognizes the desirability of increasing trade 
through voluntary agreements between two or more members.  However, there is also the 
concern that such agreements should facilitate trade among the partner countries without 
raising barriers to trade with non-partner countries.
12  Article XXIV therefore places 
                                                 
11 WTO documents refer to these as Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs), even when partner countries are 
on separate continents.  
 
12 Even in the absence of higher MFN tariffs, the preferential margin created by a PTA in effect raises 
barriers to trade with non-partner countries, resulting in trade diversion, i.e., the substitution of partner 
imports for lower-cost imports from non-partners.  Some economists have suggested that countries forming 
free trade areas should be required to reduce MFN tariff rates to offset this tendency.   11 
some significant restrictions on the common external tariffs applied by members of a 
customs union as well as the required product coverage, which is supposed to include 
“substantially all trade.” In practice, however, the GATT/WTO system has taken a 
laissez-faire attitude, with virtually no effort to ensure that agreements are consistent with 
the guidelines.  Moreover, almost all the new PTAs—the notable exception is the 
European Union—have been free-trade agreements (FTAs) rather than customs unions 
with common external tariffs.  The result has been what Jagdish Bhagwati termed a 
“spaghetti bowl” of PTAs, with selective product coverage, lengthy phase-in periods, and 
complex rules of origin (ROOs).
13       
Beyond an expectation that new PTAs will be notified to the WTO, the rules on 
preferential trading appear to exercise little if any discipline over such arrangements.  In 
practice, no preferential agreements among GATT or WTO members, whether developed 
or developing, have ever been challenged by other members. This laissez-faire posture 
has given rise to increasing concern about the effects of proliferating free trade 
agreements on progress toward multilateral trade liberalization.  This deleterious effect 
could arise for either of two reasons (Krueger 2007).  First, the limited capacity of many 
countries to conduct international trade negotiations may be taxed by efforts to form 
PTAs.  Second, WTO members‟ incentives to engage in multilateral liberalization may be 
lessened to the extent that the benefits derived from current PTA membership would 
thereby be eroded.  However, these concerns do not seem to be discouraging members 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
13 More lenient rules on preferential trading between developing countries are contained in the Tokyo 
Round agreements signed in 1979.   
   12 
from pursuing new PTAs.
14  Moreover, some theoretical and empirical research suggests 
that formation of free trade areas may actually stimulate rather than retard multilateral 
liberalization, i.e., that PTAs can act as building blocks rather than stumbling blocks 
(McCulloch and Petri 2007; Estevadeordal, Freund, and Ornelas 2008). 
 
4.  Developing countries in the international trading system 
Although the 23 nations participating in the negotiations that produced the 
original GATT in 1947 included 12 developing countries, in its early days the GATT was 
disparaged as a “rich man‟s club.”
15  The GATT initially focused almost entirely on trade 
in manufactured goods, i.e., goods that were then exported mainly by the developed 
countries, and GATT rules for poor countries were mostly the same as those for rich 
countries.  However, developing countries were accorded special treatment through 
exemptions from some rules, e.g., permission under Article XVIII to use tariffs and 
quotas to promote an infant industry or to deal with balance of payments problems (Dam 
1970, Chapter 14).  Developing countries also benefited via most-favored-nation 
                                                 
14 Pomfret (2007) argues that the extent of PTA formation has been exaggerated by use of faulty measures.  
He also notes that the most important PTAs in terms of trade volume affected, notably the European Union, 
coordinate policies in many areas in addition to trade, thereby achieving “deep integration” among their 
members.  Such agreements have complex implications for the health of the multilateral trading system 
going far beyond the usual trade creation/trade diversion analysis.  
 
15 Beginning in 1964, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) provided a 
forum where concerns of poor countries could be aired.  The UNCTAD agenda included issues such as 
one-way trade preferences for manufactured exports of poor countries, stabilization of commodity export 
prices—primary commodities had accounted for about 80 percent of export earnings of these countries and 
a non-fuel commodity was the leading export for many—and unconditional grant aid. However, much of 
the agenda required the cooperation of rich countries for funding or market access.  Some parts of the 
agenda became reality, including the Generalized System of Preferences enacted by most industrialized 
countries and export-earnings stabilization schemes implemented by the International Monetary Fund and 
the European Economic Community (EEC).    
    13 
treatment from the liberalization commitments of the advanced nations without being 
required to engage in reciprocal opening of their own markets.   
The principle of special treatment for developing countries was formalized by the 
addition in 1966 of Part IV, “Trade and Development,” to the GATT.  The Tokyo Round 
went even further with adoption of the Enabling Clause (officially, “Differential and 
More Favorable Treatment of Developing Countries”) in 1979.  The Enabling Clause 
allows advanced countries to discriminate in favor of poorer countries, and especially the 
least developed countries—as had already been done through the enactment of the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).  The Enabling Clause also allows developing 
countries to negotiate preferential trade agreements that do not satisfy the usual GATT 
criteria as spelled out in Article XXIV.
16  
Notwithstanding their special status, most of the poor countries remained poor, 
and those that prospered—mainly the NIEs and other East Asian countries—did so 
through export-oriented growth strategies.  Yet these new exporters were soon subjected 
to discriminatory trade restrictions, and the GATT did little to shield them from policies 
that violated at least the spirit of its rules.  Moreover, even after successive rounds of 
GATT-sponsored multilateral trade negotiations, labor-intensive manufactured products 
like shoes and especially textiles and apparel remained highly protected, while world 
prices of many agricultural products were depressed by generous subsidies in the United 
States and European Union.   
                                                 
16 For example, such agreements may cover only a limited range of products rather than “substantially all 
trade” as specified in Article XXIV. 
   14 
The GATT‟s special treatment of developing countries turned out to be at best 
ineffective and perhaps even counterproductive.
17  To begin with, it was predicated on 
the assumption now largely discredited that trade liberalization is less desirable for 
developing countries than for developed countries.   Facing less external pressure to open 
their markets to trade, the developing countries obtained less of the potential benefits to 
be derived from integration into world markets.  Moreover, relieving the developing 
countries of the requirement for reciprocity meant that these countries remained on the 
sidelines in shaping multilateral negotiations.  The developing countries thus lost the 
opportunity to exchange access to their own domestic markets (whether as a group or, for 
some larger countries, individually) for desired liberalization commitments from 
developed countries. By remaining nonparticipants in the successive rounds of GATT 
tariff reductions, they also lost the opportunity to contest disadvantageous exceptions to 
basic GATT rules for specific sectors, especially textiles and apparel and agriculture.  
Finally, because MFN liberalization reduces the benefits enjoyed by countries with 
preferential access to important markets, the existence of one-way preferences may retard 
progress toward global free trade.
18  
By September 1986, when the Uruguay Round negotiations began, the total 
number of GATT contracting parties had grown to 91, and the majority of the additions 
were developing countries, including newly independent nations in Africa and elsewhere.  
More developing nations joined the GATT during the negotiations that eventually 
produced the WTO, which commenced operation on January 1, 1995 with 128 members.   
                                                 
17 Jones (2010, 24-27).  Some analysts foresaw the problematic outcome of the Tokyo Round‟s emphasis 
on “special treatment” of developing countries.  See McCulloch (1983). 
 
18 In the Doha Round, some beneficiary countries have requested compensation for the erosion of benefits 
from preferential market access as MFN protection is negotiated downward.   15 
But despite ongoing efforts to provide benefits for poor countries, the operation of the 
GATT system was still dominated by the concerns of the developed nations, and those 
concerns continued to play an important role in the Uruguay Round.  By 2008, an 
overwhelming majority of the 153 WTO members were developing countries, with 32 of 
the poorest classified as least developed countries (LDCs).  Yet even with the rapid 
increase in their numbers, many observers, and especially those representing the interests 
of poor countries, judge that participation in the Uruguay Round and in the WTO have so 
far yielded few benefits for these countries.   
Of the accomplishments from the Uruguay Round, the eagerly sought dismantling 
of the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) proved to be a major disappointment to most 
developing countries, as China‟s share of export markets for textiles and apparel 
exploded and competition among suppliers dissipated quota rents.  The Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) has been criticized as 
causing, at least potentially, an adverse movement in the terms of trade of poorer 
countries, which are overwhelmingly importers of proprietary technologies created 
mainly in a few rich countries.
19  Promised elimination of U.S. and European Union 
agricultural subsidies has stalled, disappointing middle-income developing countries with 
comparative advantage in sugar, rice, cotton, soybeans, and other agricultural products.  
And the Doha Development Round, aimed specifically at addressing post-Uruguay-
Round concerns of poor countries, has been declared dead on numerous occasions.   
But laments regarding lack of progress in the Doha Round have tended to 
overshadow the increasing benefits already being derived by many developing countries 
                                                 
19 In practice, implementation delays and favorable pricing practices, especially for pharmaceuticals, have 
so far minimized the feared effects. 
   16 
from another achievement of the Uruguay Round: creation via the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU) of an enhanced process that allows members to self-enforce the 
market access to which their trading partners have agreed.  Data on disputes brought to 
the WTO show a steady stream of WTO self-enforcement actions undertaken by 
developing countries throughout the WTO era, in contrast to the declining trend of self-
enforcement actions undertaken by the developed countries over the same period (Bown 
and McCulloch 2010).  These actions have allowed at least some developing countries to 
maintain the market access to which they are entitled in situations when trading partners 
have failed to uphold their WTO commitments.   
Yet the ability of developing countries to engage in successful self-enforcement 
actions remains limited by two important factors.  First, most developing countries have 
small markets for imports.  This is partly due to small total demand but also to significant 
import barriers, which on average are still much higher than those of the developed 
countries.  Since the self-enforcement process relies on the threat of WTO-authorized 
retaliation, its potency is limited by import market size.  Thus, only larger developing 
countries are in a position to take advantage of the self-enforcement process.  In addition, 
information about foreign actions that reduce market access may be difficult to obtain, 
especially when the actions in question are less easily observed than new trade barriers.  
Developing countries have therefore focused their self-enforcement actions on types of 
WTO violations that are directly observable by exporting firms and governments, 
especially unjustified application of antidumping measures, rather than on subtler 
domestic measures that also limit imports.
20   Although WTO litigation costs of 
                                                 
20 The preponderance of cases involving antidumping may also reflect the global proliferation in this 
particular form of import protection.     17 
developing countries‟ self-enforcement actions are already heavily subsidized by the 
Advisory Center on WTO Law, the significant informational costs of determining when 
such an action is justified remain a significant deterrent (Bown 2009). 
 
5. Trade sanctions as a means of enforcing socioeconomic norms 
  The WTO is unique among international organizations in possessing an effective 
system by which its rules can be enforced.  As a result, there has been continuing 
pressure going back to the GATT era to use the WTO to enforce socioeconomic norms 
shared by a significant number of participating countries.  The justification for involving 
the GATT/WTO is that failure to honor social norms usually confers a cost advantage. A 
country‟s failure to meet such norms may therefore be regarded as “social dumping” and 
treated in an analogous way.  The main areas of domestic policy potentially affected are 
those concerned with environmental protection and labor standards, although as 
discussed in section 6.2 below, there has been recent discussion of using trade sanctions 
as a way to force macroeconomic “rebalancing.”   
  Underlying the controversy regarding use of WTO-authorized trade sanctions to 
enforce socioeconomic norms is that national attitudes regarding environmental 
protection and labor standards are strongly affected by per capita income—these norms 
tend to be “luxury goods” whose demand rises along with citizens‟ incomes.  Expecting 
poor countries to meet the same standards as rich ones may place poor countries at an 
important competitive disadvantage and may also be economically inefficient.  For 
example, to the extent that labor productivity is higher in rich countries, mutually   18 
beneficial two-way trade between rich and poor countries may require similar differences 
in wages.
21   
Poor countries argue that norms should be adjusted to take into account 
differences in stage of development, pointing out that present labor and environmental 
conditions in their economies are no worse, and in some cases far better, than those that 
prevailed in the now-industrialized nations during an earlier era.  Although actual 
GATT/WTO links between market access and social norms have so far been minor,
22 the 
issue is poised for greater significance as many developed countries begin to impose 
broad restrictions on carbon emissions and pressure developing countries, especially 
large ones like China and India, to make corresponding commitments.   
   
6.  Emerging issues 
It is easy to point to shortcomings in the world trading system that bode ill for the 
future. The Doha Round had stalled repeatedly even before the onset of the global 
financial crisis of 2008-9.  Despite a trimmed-down agenda, many observers have grown 
pessimistic about completion of the round.  But on the positive side, even the extreme 
economic disruptions accompanying the global crisis did not give rise to the feared surge 
in protectionism and defection from WTO disciplines.  Although many countries 
implemented some new protection, this was done almost entirely in ways that did not 
violate their WTO commitments, i.e., through antidumping and safeguard actions, or by 
                                                 
21 Consider a simple Ricardian model in which labor productivity in the richer country is four times as high 
in the export industry and twice as high in the import-competing industry as in the poorer country.  Two-
way trade is then possible only if the richer country‟s wage rate is at least twice but no more than four times 
as high as that of the poor country, when both are measured in the same currency. 
 
22 Their role is greater in preferential agreements.  Beginning with the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), many preferential agreements have explicitly linked market access to environmental 
and/or labor policies, though these have so far had minimal impact on policies.   19 
raising applied tariffs that were initially lower than the corresponding bound rates (Bown 
and Kee, 2010). 
Meanwhile, the development of an unprecedented bilateral imbalance between the 
United States and China has placed an increasing strain on a system based on reciprocity, 
and a continuing surge of new preferential, i.e., discriminatory, trading arrangements has 
increased the tension between the GATT/WTO‟s key MFN principle and trade realities.  
MFN has now come to mean least-favored-nation treatment, i.e., paying the “list price” at 
the border.  Beneficiaries of one-way preferences argue that fairness requires 
compensation for erosion of benefits when successful MFN liberalization cuts the 
preferential margin they now enjoy.  And finally, the perceived need to reverse the 
growth of carbon emissions will pose an important new challenge for the WTO, as 
participating countries seek trade policy measures to deal with “carbon leakage” from 
countries not willing to join in these efforts.  How are these situations likely to play out in 
terms of evolution of the world trading system? 
 
6.1   The Doha Round.  As of late 2010, the stalled Doha Round, which was initiated in 
November 2001 as the Doha Development Round, had already exceeded the length of any 
of its predecessors, and with no end in sight.  In contrast, even the ambitious and 
protracted Uruguay Round had required “only” seven years and seven months from 
inception to signing.  Economists and public officials are divided on both the feasibility 
of completing the round and the importance of doing so.
23  Some see the lack of progress 
                                                 
23  Martin and Messerlin (2007) review the history of previous rounds of multilateral negotiations in order 
to evaluate alternative explanations for the Doha Round‟s lack of progress.  In the end they remain 
cautiously optimistic about the round‟s eventual success.  Baldwin (2009) likewise draws parallels with 
past rounds, pointing out that the history of past negotiations is also “littered with lengthy stalemates.”   20 
as a reflection of the problems inherent in achieving consensus among such a large and 
diverse group of nations and even question whether there is any future for multilateral 
trade liberalization along the lines of the GATT rounds of the past.  This view gains some 
credence from the heightened pace at which new preferential agreements have been 
initiated and concluded over the same period.  Moreover, the recent economic woes of 
the advanced countries have further reduced domestic political support for any new 
concessions to developing countries.  
Even those who argue for completing the round are divided on what is to be gained 
by doing so.  Some see the fate of the Doha Round as significant mostly for what it 
implies about global support for the WTO as an institution.  In this view, a failed round 
could undermine the WTO‟s authority in setting and enforcing guidelines for national 
policies toward trade (Hoekman, Martin, and Mattoo 2009).  However, others see a Doha 
failure mainly as a missed opportunity to continue the GATT/WTO‟s progress in 
promoting a more open and transparent trading system.  In direct contrast to proposals to 
further limit the scope of the negotiations as a way to facilitate agreement, Hufbauer, 
Schott, and Wong (2010) argue for a more ambitious package that would increase 
anticipated gains for major parties and thus justify the political effort required to bring the 
round to a successful conclusion. Whether this approach is feasible remains to be seen, 
but it is certainly true that progress can only be made if each participant perceives a net 
benefit from going forward; raising the stakes could energize the moribund process.  
However, with world leaders already challenged by more urgent priorities, it is not 
obvious where the necessary leadership for a step in this direction can be found. 
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6.2   Reducing bilateral imbalances.  As the world emerges from the global financial 
crisis, the need for “rebalancing” supply and demand across countries and continents has 
become evident.  But where does the responsibility for rebalancing lie, and how should it 
be achieved?  Accomplishing this goal during a still-fragile recovery beset with other 
important international dilemmas, such as the fate of the Euro, poses a formidable 
challenge.    
Many believe that a major appreciation of China‟s currency is a necessary 
condition for sustained shrinkage of its bilateral surplus with the United States.  If so, is it 
appropriate for the WTO to become the enforcer of this prescription?  Mattoo and 
Subramanian (2009) argue for joint action by the International Monetary Fund and the 
WTO—the latter‟s participation required because the IMF has no ability to enforce its 
policy prescriptions on a member such as China that is not requesting IMF loans.  
However, use of trade restrictions to force an exchange-rate appreciation would represent 
a major shift in the mission of the GATT/WTO, which normally focuses on measures that 
affect the composition of trade flows rather than aggregate imbalances (Bown and 
McCulloch, 2009).  Moving in this direction would open the door to further actions 
whenever a country‟s exports seemed “too large” or imports “too small”—according to 
criteria still to be determined.   
Some argue that by maintaining a low international price for the yuan, China is in 
effect subsidizing its exports, and that a countervailing duty equal to the extent of yuan 
undervaluation would be appropriate under WTO rules.  However, there is no consensus 
among economic experts on the extent of yuan undervaluation.  Moreover, an analysis by 
Staiger and Sykes (forthcoming) raises analytical doubts concerning this approach.    22 
Staiger and Sykes conclude that the difficulty of determining the trade effects of China‟s 
currency practices “calls into question the wisdom and legitimacy of countermeasures 
that have been proposed….”  In any case, even a large revaluation of the yuan in terms of 
the dollar would not be enough to restore bilateral balance between China and the United 
States unless accompanied by a substantial, sustained increase in national saving in the 
United States and a corresponding reduction in China and other surplus countries. 
 
6.3  The trend toward preferential trading.  Sharply contrasting with the absence of 
progress in multilateral trade negotiations is continued momentum in the negotiation of 
new preferential agreements.  The attraction of moving in this direction is obvious—with 
a small number of participants it is much easier to craft terms that are mutually beneficial.  
While excluded countries as a group may be harmed, this effect is usually sufficiently 
dispersed to avoid any major fallout.  Yet even the most ardent supporters of the 
preferential approach see it as a complement to multilateral liberalization rather than a 
substitute.  The real challenge is to avoid creating a thicket of inconsistent policies that 
further complicate the task of achieving liberalization multilaterally (Baldwin 2006).  
Plummer (2007) advocates a multi-layered liberalization process in which regional 
agreements are based on “best practices” (the lasagna bowl).  These might include a 
requirement that PTAs accept new members, perhaps after an initial waiting period.  
Kawai, Petri, and Sisli Ciammara (2009) and Lawrence (2008) envision the evolution of 
the WTO into a host organization for regional “clubs” formed by subsets of its members.  
In contrast to the current laissez-faire approach toward PTAs, the WTO could develop   23 
and enforce guidelines for club actions and also serve as a neutral arbiter of disputes 
arising among club members. 
  The tension between preferential trading and multilateral liberalization is greatest 
in the case of poor countries that are the beneficiaries of one-way preferences.  While it 
may be laudable to bend WTO rules in a way that ensures gains for even the poorest 
participants, there may be other ways to achieve this goal without creating built-in 
opposition to multilateral liberalization (which reduces the value of trade preferences).  
One approach that has received increasing attention in recent years is aid for trade—
provision of resources that help poor countries achieve gains from trade, through 
measures ranging from expert assistance in identifying areas of comparative advantage to 
improvements in port facilities and customs procedures.  Measures of this kind facilitate 
mutually beneficial trade by accelerating the integration of poor countries into world 
markets, rather than creating an artificial advantage for a particular group of exporters.  
Another approach is to maintain the model of a single undertaking, but, as in the Uruguay 
Round, allow developing countries a longer period in which to achieve compliance.  A 
third option is to focus MFN tariff-cutting efforts on the goods of greatest interest to 
developing country exporters. 
 
6.4  Trade and climate change.  Reconciling WTO rules with national policies to limit 
greenhouse gas emissions is sure to pose a major challenge for the world trading system.  
Countries contemplating across-the-board action to reduce emissions face strong 
domestic political opposition, especially from industries whose costs will rise 
significantly as a consequence.  Unless all countries adopt comparable measures, national   24 
policies raise obvious concerns about lost international competitiveness in the short run 
and migration of high-emissions industries to other countries in the longer run—in either 
case severely undermining the effectiveness of national actions in reducing global 
emissions.  Policy proposals have therefore typically included border measures (taxes and 
subsidies intended to neutralize the impact on trade competitiveness) as well as 
government subsidies intended to reduce the private cost of complying with new 
standards or to spur innovation.   
Hufbauer, Charnovitz, and Kim (2009) identify the areas in which national 
climate-change policies currently under review are most likely to conflict with WTO 
principles and thus result in a surge of new WTO disputes.  These authors argue for 
negotiating a Code of Good WTO Practice on Greenhouse Gas Emissions Controls that 
would create a “green policy space” within which WTO members could take appropriate 
measures to limit emissions.  In principle, the green space would allow countries some 
leeway within WTO rules to maintain the competitiveness of their own industries while 
raising environmental standards.  At the same time, the Code would prevent the misuse of 
environmental policies to discriminate against goods and services produced abroad or to 
favor imports from preferred source countries. 
A related and more immediate issue concerns trade policies toward green goods 
and services—the inputs used to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.  Negotiations on trade 
in green goods and services are on the Doha Round agenda, and Pascal Lamy, Director-
General of the WTO, argues that WTO members have a strong interest in opening their 
markets to such goods as a way to improve the efficiency of their economies.
24  But 
                                                 
24 Reuters, “WTO‟s Lamy sees trade pact boosting green goods,” May 20, 2010, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLDE64J13F20100520 (accessed 5/26/2010).   25 
Lamy‟s argument applies equally to liberalizing imports of almost any type of industrial 
input, and it thus ignores the need to overcome opposition from competing domestic 
producers.  In practice, such a negotiation is likely to be complex and protracted, 
beginning with the determination of exactly which goods and services should be 
included.   
Compared to other environment-related policies that have generated past WTO 
disputes (e.g., protection of dolphins and turtles), both costs and benefits associated with 
efforts to limit climate change are likely to be very large, and their effects experienced 
over many economic sectors.  For these reasons, such a negotiation is urgent.  However, 
finding the necessary common ground for agreement in a large and diverse group of 
nations is sure to be difficult—perhaps the largest challenge yet for the international 
trading system. 
 
7.  Looking ahead 
This chapter has reviewed the evolution and structure of the GATT/WTO system 
as well as several emerging issues likely to affect its performance in achieving its various 
goals.  However, the current state of the international trading system provides good 
reasons for optimism.  Most important, the system has survived more or less unscathed 
the worst global economic conditions since the Great Depression and the inevitable 
resurgence of protectionist sentiment worldwide.  WTO disciplines, backed by the 
dispute settlement mechanism, remain a potent safeguard against unchecked unilateral 
measures to limit foreign competition.  Despite some increase in (GATT-legal) temporary 
protection, trade flows have rebounded vigorously as world economic growth has   26 
revived.  But as discussed in the previous section, the system has yet to deal with some 
pressing issues.  Thus, the status quo, while representing an important achievement in 
terms of multilateral cooperation, will not be enough to maintain the open and predictable 
market access that WTO members have come to expect. 
  Can the necessary progress be made?  In the past, U.S. hegemony played a key 
role in shaping international institutions, but the United States does not appear ready to 
assume anything beyond shared responsibility for the provision of global public goods.  
New problems have also been raised by the emergence of large and economically 
powerful developing countries, such as China, India, and Brazil.  Still poor relative to the 
United States and other industrialized countries, these countries are reluctant to 
participate in international agreements on the same terms as their much richer 
counterparts, yet their impact on the global economy and on global emissions is too large 
to be exempted without undermining the overall effectiveness of the system.  The 
solution may lie in a two-part strategy that builds on the success of the WTO via 
completion of the Doha Round while also dealing flexibly with some complex issues by 
building from the bottom up, i.e., by channeling PTA formation and expansion along 
lines that provide a clearer path toward multilateral liberalization.   27 
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